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AbstrAct  Transitional justice mechanisms and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have had only a limited success in overcoming 
ethnic divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather than elaborating upon the role of 
local political elites in perpetuating ethnic divisions, we examine ordinary peoples’ 
popular perceptions of war and its aftermath. In our view, the idea that elites have 
complete control over the broader narratives about the past is misplaced. We argue 
that transitional justice and peace mechanisms supported by external actors are 
always interpreted on the ground in context-specific ways, creating different citizens’ 
experiences, “memories” of the war, and their respective hopes and disappointments 
in regards to the relationship between peace and justice in Bosnia. We suggest that 
analyses of the post-conflict developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina must take into 
account what gives the narratives of exclusion their power, and what are the objective 
political, social and economic constraints that continue to provide a fertile ground for 
their widespread support.
Introduction
In their response to the signing of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which 
ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Antonio Cassese, the first president of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and 
Justice Richard Goldstone, a Prosecutor at the ICTY, noted that:
Justice is an indispensable ingredient of the process of national reconciliation. 
It is essential to the restoration of peaceful and normal relations between people 
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who have had to live under a reign of terror. It breaks the cycle of violence, 
hatred and extra-judicial retribution. Thus Peace and Justice go hand-in-hand 
(ICTY, 1995). 
Firmly asserting the linked nature of peace and justice, Cassese and 
Goldstone outlined many of the hopes of the international community for 
the ICTY and for its role in the Bosnian peacebuilding process. Moreover, 
the current president of the ICTY, Theodor Meron, noted in his annual report 
that the ICTY has pioneered a new world order “in which the question is not 
if but when and where they (perpetrators) will be called to account” (ICTY, 
2012). In contrast to these sentiments, twenty years since The Hague Tribunal 
opened its doors (1993), most of the local population in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(hereafter Bosnia) seems to be united in its belief that ICTY did not live up 
to its high expectations. The aim of this article is to analyse this empirical 
puzzle of the emerging gap between the international praises of the role of 
ICTY and Transitional Justice (TJ) mechanisms in contributing to peace and 
justice in Bosnia and the disappointment and resignation, but also increasing 
lack of interest, of the Bosnian population in the reconciliatory potentials of 
ICTY and TJ in bringing Bosnian communities together. 
The article demonstrates that, while the ICTY could rightly be seen as a 
pioneer of a new normative trend of supranational prosecutions of war crimes 
and human rights violations, its contribution to the reconciliation and social 
reconstruction on the ground has been limited. We argue that transitional justice 
and peace mechanisms supported by external actors are always interpreted on 
the ground in context-specific ways, creating different citizens’ experiences, 
“memories” of the war, and their respective hopes and disappointments in 
regards to the relationship between peace and justice in Bosnia. Contrary to 
the expectations of the international actors and scholars arguing in favour of 
TJ mechanisms, analysis of the post-conflict developments in Bosnia shows 
that local actors have yet to come to terms with the historical narrative that 
would transcend ethnic divisions. In other words, Bosnian local communities 
continue to be segregated both physically and mentally from each other. 
The disconnect between the internationally supported goals of reconciliation 
and the “local” acts of contestation and communal citizenship practices is 
most visible in the popular perceptions of war and its aftermath in two major 
Bosnian cities: Sarajevo and Banja Luka. Whereas before the war these cities, 
together with Mostar, represented the multiethnic and multicultural centres 
of Bosnia, after 1995 they emerged as symbols of division and mutually 
contradictory nation building projects. The different interpretations of the 
history of the war are cogently captured by a member of one community 
organization in Banja Luka: “When it comes to the past, the war, the 
consequences of the war there exist two parallel worlds, one with the center 
in Sarajevo and the other in Banja Luka” (Personal communication, June 7, 
2012). Through the evaluation of TJ literature, but also drawing on field work 
and interviews conducted in Sarajevo and Banja Luka in June 2010 and May 
and June of 2012, this article examines the contested ways in which the views 
of justice have been shaped by local Bosniak and Serbian populations since 
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1995. The interviews were conducted primarily with key informants, namely 
local bureaucrats working for the international organizations in Bosnia, civil 
society representatives and activists engaged in issues of reconciliation and 
peacebuilding.
This article proceeds as follows: we examine the international approach 
to peacebuilding within the broader socio-economic context in Bosnia. Then 
we turn to the scholarly debates about the contribution of external justice 
mechanisms, particularly focusing on the ICTY. Finally, we review the 
overlooked importance of ethnic identity politics in shaping responses to the 
overall approach of transitional justice. We also turn to specific examples of 
the ways in which the local population responded to the ICTY ruling and 
how it deals with the legacies of war. We then examine issues pertaining to 
peace and justice from the ground up by focusing on local concerns raised 
about living with the legacy of the conflict. We argue for a more grounded 
analysis of transitional justice mechanisms, an analysis that incorporates 
local contexts and the process of the localization of global norms and goals 
(Acharya, 2004). Thus, we argue for a particular focus on the ways in which 
justice and peace are interpreted, supported, or contested in the local social 
and political space and emphasize the agency of the local population in 
appropriating TJ mechanisms according to their own specific needs rather 
than in the interests and goals of international policy makers. 
A Blueprint for Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement has been successful in bringing about 
a cessation of hostilities and violence. At the same time, it has also been 
criticized for further cementing the divisions in Bosnian society by ensuring 
that the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) are represented 
in state institutions and leadership positions according to the rigid rules of 
ethnic representation. Moreover, Bosnia emerged as a federation comprised 
of the Bosniak/Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). The Peace Agreement simply 
legitimized the structures that emerged from the war by incorporating them 
into the Bosnian Constitution. 
The international community has tried to provide a balance between 
the differing ethnic interests, most visibly through the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR). It has also sought to ensure compliance with the ICTY 
and stressed the importance of addressing war crimes that were committed 
during the conflict. The active role of the international community in Bosnian 
politics and indeed in engineering the Bosnian state, however, has led some 
Western scholars to argue that as an internationally supported state, Bosnia 
has become an “inverted state” (Chandler, 2009, p. 74), or a state that is 
overly shaped by external agendas rather than by local processes. In his work 
on Bosnia and other post-conflict states, Oliver Richmond has argued that 
such a top down approach to peacebuilding has resulted in “virtual peace” 
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on the ground (2008, p.440). Richmond argues that many of these externally 
created institutions are disconnected from citizens and from the dynamics 
on the ground. Yet, despite the growing critique, the external approach to 
peacebuilding is also mirrored in the efforts of the international community 
to bring about transitional justice to the region, and thus connects peace 
with justice as the only viable alternative to the current state of affairs of the 
continuation of war through the means of politics. But to what extent can 
we expect externally driven processes of peacebuilding to resonate in local 
contexts? 
The original intention of external state builders in Bosnia was to compensate 
for the overtly rigid power-sharing arrangements in the political field by 
creating powerful constitutional and institutional arrangements that would 
(in principle) allow for the development of civil society and human rights. 
According to this logic, those interested in politics would enter the political 
arena with explicit and somewhat contradictory aims of simultaneously 
building democracy, on the one hand, and defending one’s national interest, 
on the other. Those disinclined to enter politics would have other venues 
open to them such as joining any of the externally-financed civil society 
organizations that were supposed to counter-balance the paralyzing effects 
of various power-sharing arrangements in the respective countries. The hope 
was that through the active engagement of the international community (IC), 
some of the ethnic aspects of power-sharing arrangements would eventually 
be replaced with more integrative institutions along the civil society model 
allowing the pursuit of TJ to be accepted across the ethnic boundaries. 
This, however, never fully materialized. Instead, the political arrangement 
and institutionalization of power sharing, on one side, and the failures of the 
reversal of ethnic cleansing on the other, have created a particular post-war 
demographic reality of the current Bosnian state where most of the regions 
are clearly dominated by one ethnic group over the other. In addition, and 
often pointed to as one of the reasons for the continuing hold of the nationalist 
narratives, is the Bosnian economic reality whereby the unemployment rate 
is at 28% with youth unemployment estimated to be twice that rate (World 
Bank, 2012). Moreover, according to the latest Transparency International 
Report (2012), Bosnia is one of the most corrupt states in Europe: its annual 
index of corruption perception ranks Bosnia as 72nd out of 176 countries in 
the world (Jukic, 2012). Of course, the reality behind these numbers points 
towards the systematic nature of Bosnian corruption; that is the fact that 
corruption is one of the pillars of the Bosnian economic and political system. 
In summary, the unclear role of the IC, the never-ending political crisis 
of the Bosnian state, its economic and social uncertainties, rising poverty, 
state-wide corruption, and demographic failures of multiethnic integration, 
all represent the context within which Bosnian narratives co-exist. While we 
focus here on nationalism and a politics of reconciliation as seen through 
identity lenses, we fully recognize that identity narratives never exist in a 
vacuum. Rather, they are malleable and change in response to the day-to-
day Bosnian economic, social and political realities. It is only within this 
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broader context that we assess the initial ICTY goals of individualizing 
criminal responsibility, legitimizing a historical record and contributing to 
reconciliation; that is we assess how these goals have been appropriated and 
transformed into hotly contested, essentialized and ethnicized arguments 
over what is “ours” and what is “theirs,” who are the victims and who are the 
perpetrators, and over the very nature of the war itself, whether it was a civil 
war or an act of aggression and genocide against the Bosniak population. 
Transitional Justice Remedies for Bosnia’s Symptoms 
The competing narratives over the war in Bosnia revolve around whether 
Republika Srpska is a legitimate entity or not. In the eyes of Bosniaks, it 
is not, for they were victims of genocide; in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, 
Republika Srpska is a legitimate expression of their need to protect themselves 
against the potential physical threat of other communities in Bosnia. In order 
to support this claim, the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia is being connected to 
the Bosnian Serbs’ horrific experiences during WWII. The way in which 
these competing narratives are posited against each other leaves little room 
for compromise. More than seventeen years after the signing of the Dayton 
Agreement, these narratives still hold sway over both local populations and 
their respective elites. 
Passionate debates over the question of who is right and whose justice 
should be served are fully understandable. After all, at the heart of this debate 
is the question of moral and legal responsibility for the crimes committed 
in one’s national name. The general premise of TJ mechanisms, well 
summarized by Cassese (2004), has been to individualize the guilt and stop 
perpetuating divisive categories of framing the conflict exclusively in group 
terms. According to such an understanding, Cecile Aptel observes, “it is 
reasonable to assume that criminal justice, including international and hybrid 
jurisdiction, can contribute to the reconciliatory process in divided societies, 
as long as significant portions of all communities accept the legitimacy of the 
accountability mechanisms” (2011, p. 180). In Bosnia this is precisely the 
issue because accountability mechanisms, such as the ICTY and domestic 
trials, are increasingly seen as political theatre of the absurd rather than the 
mechanism that would allow the truth about the war to be discovered and 
shared by members of different Bosnian ethnic groups, ultimately leading to 
their mutual recognition and reconciliation. Thus, Bosnian experience with 
TJ seems to go against both international policy makers’ expectations and 
the scholarly literature’s claims that the need to address past violence is a 
necessary step in ensuring sustainable peace (Leebaw, 2008, p. 96).
More recently, Lara J. Nettelfield (2010) has further elaborated on the 
significance of TJ for postwar states. In her book, Courting Democracy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar State, 
she focuses exclusively on the role of the ICTY and hybrid jurisdiction in 
Bosnia. Even though she appears to emphasize only the legal elements of TJ, 
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her main conclusion is that the real benefit of The Hague process and other 
forms of TJ is their contribution toward “positive democratic development 
inside Bosnia,” and particularly the “creation of new postwar identities based 
on the rule of law and participation” (Nettelfield, 2010, p. 15). Drawing upon 
the work of Mark Drumbl, she is doubtful that retributive and deterrent goals 
of domestic justice can be easily replicated in the context of international 
criminal law. After all, the central tenets of international criminal law are: 
to uncover the truth about the past atrocities, punish perpetrators and help 
victims; provide the rule of law, support reconciliation, and serve as deterrent 
for future crimes (Nettelfield, 2010, p. 10). While fully accepting Drumbl’s 
caution about retribution and deterring potentials of international justice, 
Nettelfield argues that the extra-legal rationale for international tribunals still 
stands. 
Thus, it would seem that Nettelfield departs from the general thrust of the 
TJ literature, while still endorsing the TJ mechanisms. For her, the broader 
normative impacts of TJ mechanisms are more important than some other 
goals of international criminal law. That is, the justification for international 
prosecutions lies in “the messaging value of punishment to affirm respect 
for law, reinforce a moral consensus, narrate history and educate the public” 
(Drumbl, quoted in Nettlefield, 2010, p. 11). From this perspective, Nettelfield 
concludes that “the work of court encouraged political participation by 
representatives of family associations and civil society groups who might 
otherwise have lacked legitimacy; it provided them and elites with a language 
about accountability and, in some cases, a set of tools, namely, law, with 
which they could lobby for forms of redress” (Nettelfield, 2010, pp. 273-
274). In other words, even though Bosnians failed to receive justice, they 
received democracy (or, at least, they started moving in that direction), and 
through the work of international and hybrid courts certain forms of civic 
and political engagement have developed that otherwise might not have been 
possible. From a policy perspective, this conclusion radically steps away 
from the conventional understanding of TJ and yet still heavily relies on the 
same assumptions about the possibilities of TJ to contribute to reconciliation 
on the ground.
Jelena Subotic (2009) offers yet another insight about the unintended 
consequences of TJ mechanisms. She argues that TJ institutions have become 
very popular in addressing past abuses in post-conflict societies, while at the 
same time such states “use these mechanisms to achieve goals quite different 
from those envisioned by international justice institutions and activists” 
(2009, p. 6). Thus, she recognizes yet another layer of the top-down approach 
in bringing justice to post-conflict societies. While the mainstream literature 
evaluates the workings of the international agencies, she believes that between 
the local populations and external state builders, local elites have the power 
to filter policies in ways that are clearly not foreseen by the International 
Court of Justice or any other international organizations dedicated to bringing 
justice to these countries. Thus, Subotic insists that analysts should not only 
focus on whether or not states comply with a TJ framework, but also how and 
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why they may comply. 
Subotic proposes an analytical framework that is based on distinguishing 
between four major state and societal coalitions: true believers who fully 
support the normative principles of TJ; norm resisters; instrumental adapters; 
and international norm promoters. Her argument is very simple but effective 
—in situations when norm resisters and instrumental adopters are stronger 
than true believers, the normative and institutional compliance will take the 
forms that are unanticipated by the international promoters (Subotic, 2009, 
pp. 6-8). In other words, various coalitions within a post-conflict state will 
engage in appropriating TJ initiatives according to their own respective 
political objectives. 
Subotic’s contribution to transitional justice literature lies in pointing 
out some of the unforeseen consequences of TJ initiatives. But, there must 
also be a critical examination of the key justification of transitional justice 
institutions: they create a historical record of the systematic violence that 
stands in counter to the denial of the extent and impact of the violence (Leebaw, 
2008, p.107). The lack of an accepted historical record of the events in Bosnia 
during the conflict is evident from an examination of the speeches of various 
ethnic leaders, the divided curriculum and the national subject of history, and 
through discussions on the ground which can often reveal the ethnic group 
which the story represents. The insight gained from Subotic’s research is that 
far from coming to a single version of events the various elites have used the 
past to pursue their own political goals. Isabelle Delpla summarizes the issue 
when she states that, “judiciary truth established in The Hague is far from 
achieving public acknowledgment in Bosnia” (2007, p. 216). Rather than 
creating a historical record about the conflict what has resulted in Bosnia 
is a use of the past by elites to play to their own ethnic group in order to 
pursue nation building projects. This is further shown by the fact that without 
international pressure there is also an unwillingness to prosecute members 
of their own community (Zoglin, 2005). Hence, the various mechanisms 
including the ICTY and ICJ have not been able to bring out an agreed upon 
record of the Bosnian past. Any effort to do so was, and still is, thwarted 
by various local actors’ countermoves, or in Subotic’s terminology, by the 
countermoves of norm resisters and instrumental adapters. 
However, despite the challenges facing the approaches to peace and 
justice at the political level, some scholars have argued for caution on 
purely principled grounds of the incompatibility between reconciliation and 
punishment. They doubt that it is possible to expand the legal mandate of TJ 
to include reconciliation if the ultimate goal of justice is the prosecution of 
war crimes (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2004, p. 30). Yet, despite reconciliation 
not being central in the UN resolution that created the ICTY (Fletcher and 
Weinstein, 2004, p. 37), it became central in the subsequent interpretations 
of the role of the ICTY. In addition, Vanessa Pupavac suggests there is a 
darker side of internationally supported policies of reconciliation: “War 
crimes tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions are championed 
as political therapy, facilitating closure for traumatized nations” (2004, p. 
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378). Rightly critical of the approach of treating the post-violence state as 
a mentally unfit patient, Pupavac shows that such an approach to TJ simply 
puts the finger of blame on the local population itself. Similarly, Chandra 
Lekha Sriram argues that “In particular, the very institutionalisation of 
these processes [TJ mechanisms] means that they may seem, or actually be, 
disconnected from the individuals and societies they are designed to benefit, 
or be viewed as externally imposed and illegitimate by some of the putative 
beneficiaries” (2010, p. 290). 
So what is the state of reconciliation in Bosnian society? Valery Perry 
(2009) rightly notes that “reconciliation” is a word rarely mentioned in 
good faith in Bosnia. In her survey of reconciliation processes, she divides 
them into the following tracks: a non-governmental reconciliation (such as 
the incorporation of the experiences from other countries through the work 
of the so-called “conflict resolutionaires,” mediation efforts sponsored by 
the IC, the Association of Citizens-Truth and Reconciliation); research, 
training and education; and official governmental reconciliation. However, 
despite identifying certain progress in these areas, the overall conclusion is 
hardly optimistic as the principles of the zero-sum game are as prevalent in 
the sphere of reconciliation as they are in the more traditionally perceived 
world of politics (Perry, 2009). Nevertheless, the question of the underlying 
causes for the failures of TJ cannot and should not be looked at only from 
the viewpoint of the Bosnian zero-sum game. Such understanding puts too 
much emphasis on the role of the local elites as primarily responsible for the 
failures of TJ. The underlying assumption is then that if only there were more 
enlightened political elites in Bosnia TJ mechanisms would work well. 
As already discussed, Subotic clearly outlines how domestic elites have 
hijacked the TJ processes. However, she relies too heavily on insights from the 
rational choice approach to collective action problems, focusing exclusively 
on the initiatives of Bosnian ethnic and civic entrepreneurs. According to this 
view, various moves and counter-moves of ethnic representatives ultimately 
lead to attracting necessary support for their respective political agendas. The 
extent to which they are successful also represents the extent to which they 
are in charge of the collective action problem; that is, they are in a position 
to impose or attract members of their respective local communities to share 
and support their political views on the causes of and possible solutions to the 
crisis in the Bosnian society. 
In our view, the idea that elites have complete control over the broader 
narratives about the past is misplaced. This elite centered view corresponds 
to what Rogers Brubaker refers to as the “elite manipulation” analysis of 
ethnic politics (1998, p. 289). Brubaker argues that the elite dominance 
perspective is limiting because it brushes over the complex process of the 
constitution of interests and their role in the identity formation. Elites cannot 
simply set agendas dominated by their own interests. Their ability to do so is 
shaped by the issues that resonate within their communities and a particular 
community’s understanding of its relevant identity. For Brubaker, the “elite 
manipulation” argument misses the variation in “conditions of responsiveness” 
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or the reasons why in certain areas and in certain communities inflammatory 
politicians succeed with their nationalist narratives (1998, p. 291), and in 
some others they do not. In relation to the Yugoslav conflicts, he emphasizes 
the importance of already existing conditions of unofficial narratives about 
past persecutions that influence further the ways in which individuals respond 
to various forms of elite manipulations. 
The same argument can be adjusted to explain why international elites 
are not able to impose a particular order or their own interests on local 
populations. Roger Mac Ginty (2011) aptly describes the interaction 
between the “internationals” and “locals” as being hybrid in character, where 
international actors are not only trying to influence local actors, but are being 
influenced equally in return. International actors involved in the TJ processes 
become involved in the various narratives, often because their actions have 
unintended consequences (for example, being seen as expressing support for 
one side over the other). More importantly, Mac Ginty stresses that local 
resistance to external agendas can be both positive and negative, and that 
sectarian and selfish interests motivate some acts, though not all. Regardless, 
he notes that, “in some cases, resistance leads to a better form of peace: a 
peace that is more comfortable and sustainable for the communities that 
must live that peace. A great difficulty is that many international actors and 
perspectives are unable to accept such hybrid forms of peace as ‘peace’” 
(Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 212). 
Following the lead of Brubaker and Mac Ginty, we argue that the local 
context is a two-way street in which ordinary citizens are not simply puppets 
passively responding to entrepreneurial actions of various elites. They do 
have, and exert their own agency, however, not always to the liking of those 
believing in the principles of TJ and liberal peace building. Moreover, in the 
context of the competing narratives over the recent past in Bosnia, neither 
domestic nor international actors can impose simply what they deem as 
legitimate accounts of the war. Local populations are actively engaged in 
creating and disseminating stories about TJ on their own to the extent that 
such narratives provide meaning to the their actions.
A Ground Up View of Peace and Justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Why do TJ mechanisms fall short of expectations? Paige Arthur (2011) 
argues that TJ concepts and policy approaches do not take seriously enough 
the role that our identities play in channelling our actions. Following Fearon 
and Laitin, she reminds us that ethnic identities are different from other social 
identities “because they are constructed around the idea of descent, as well 
as social and biological reproduction” (Arthur, 2011, p. 273). As such, they 
are composed of “cultural attributes” (religion, language, custom, myths), 
neither of which could be easily handpicked by individuals (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2000, p. 848). Arthur does not dismiss the individualist constructivist 
arguments; nevertheless, she points out that there are limits to which 
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identities can be constructed. This, however, has important consequences for 
our understanding of TJ, for, as Arthur explains, ethnic violence can never be 
reduced to political violence (2011, p. 273). Accordingly, an overtly formulaic 
approach that shies away from the problem of the salience of ethnic identities 
is bound to fail when TJ measures become translated by local populations to 
fit their preconceived notions of identity. 
In similar fashion, Will Kymlicka maintains that the concept of TJ is very 
closely tied to a civic understanding of nation building that assumes that all 
citizens, irrespective of their cultural differences, share the same vision of 
political community. However, despite the strong support for such a model 
of political community both among the scholars and external policy makers, 
this model is quite often untenable in societies where more than one cultural 
community shares the same space and memories (Kymlicka, 2011, pp. 303-
307). Under such conditions, the members of other communities quite often 
perceive the support for political community that will transcend cultural and 
ethnic boundaries as an open policy of assimilation. In more extreme cases, 
this will lead to open ethnic conflicts where all kinds of mass crimes are 
committed in the name of one’s nation. Thus, in the context of post-conflict 
development, divided societies quite often perceive conventional polices of 
so-called citizenization with distrust, for they can always be interpreted as 
more beneficial to the majority or the dominant group in such a state. In other 
words, a purely civic form of nationhood quite often (whether inadvertently 
or not) leads to clashes over the issues of ethnicity (language, identity, 
customs, religion, memories of the past). Overall, the politicization of ethnic 
and religious ties shapes citizens’ responses to various TJ mechanisms. 
Engagement with TJ mechanisms is shaped by in-group mentalities 
according to which individuals are primarily wishing to represent one’s own 
community concerns and grievances. In this context, storytelling emerges 
as one of principal ways to interpret recent past events, and in the process, 
strengthen the boundaries between members of one particular ethnic group 
and those of the other. 
The case of Bosnia is symptomatic in this regard; two examples, namely, 
the Oric trial and the correct number of the war casualties in the Bosnian 
war, illustrate the ways in which the norms and institutions of TJ were 
appropriated for the purposes of further delineating the boundaries between 
the Bosniak and Serb communities in Bosnia. But, why focus on these two 
cases: the Oric trial and the body count? From the perspective of liberal peace 
building and TJ literature, they can be dismissed in favour of some other 
accounts of successes and failures of TJ in Bosnia. In that respect, the Oric 
case is particularly problematic given that the Bosniak authorities closely 
cooperated with the IC and thus were actively engaged in Oric’s surrender. In 
support of this view, we cite a very rich literature dealing with some of these 
issues, including, Delpla, Bougarel and Fournel (2012), Nettelfield (2010), 
and Clark (2009). Nevertheless, we do not deal with the technical aspects of 
the mechanisms of TJ, but rather with the perceptions of these efforts on local 
populations and how they understand it. As Marc Howard Ross explains:
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In long-term intransigent conflict, strong threats to identity are an essential 
part of the conflict dynamics, and any efforts to defuse such a situation must 
take seriously the stories that participants recount, and the perceived threats to 
identity. The point, after all, is not whether participants’ accounts are true or 
false from some objective point of view but that they are meaningful to the 
parties involved. (1997, p. 64)
From this perspective, the Oric case and the number of war casualties 
are central to local Bosniak and Serbian efforts to deal with the legacies 
of the war, and how to make meaning of the war. This aspect in no way 
should be understood to be the replacement for the debates about individual 
responsibility of those involved in war crimes, or of the role of impartial 
institutions in making reconciliation possible. It simply recognizes local 
communities’ efforts to deal with the past that do not correspond necessarily 
to the internationally prescribed political objectives for Bosnia. Without 
understanding them on their own merit, we simply cannot see how a more 
integrative counter narrative can be developed successfully. 
The Oric case was the first case that tested Bosniaks’ trust in the work 
of the ICTY; for the first time, it was one of their own that was on trial. 
Naser Oric was a Bosniak war commander in the area around Srebrenica. 
The NATO forces arrested him in 2003 for the crimes committed against the 
Bosnian Serbs in the Serbian villages surrounding Srebrenica in 1992 and 
1993. Despite the Bosnian government’s support for Oric’s arrest and his 
transfer to The Hague, the action provoked many Bosniaks to accuse The 
Hague Tribunal as playing the ethnic balance game (Kebo, 2005). Thus, for 
the Bosniak side, such an arrest was, in the words of one of the representatives 
of the NGO Mothers of Srebrenica, a shameful act because his only crime 
was, in the words of many, to “defend his own people.” Others in the Bosniak 
community have argued that Oric’s crimes, the killing of seven Serbs, are 
far less serious than the offences committed by thousands of former Serb 
soldiers, none of whom have been indicted. On the other side, as a journalist 
reported at the time, a local Serb, and the head of the association of war 
invalids in a Serbian village, Bratunac, had said, “Naser’s departure to The 
Hague proves that justice will reach everyone. We are beginning to believe 
a bit more that The Hague is not biased, that it is not arresting only Serbs, 
but all those suspected of committing crimes” (Kebo, 2005). In July 2006, 
Oric was sentenced to two years in prison to be immediately released for 
time already served. On his way back from The Hague, Oric enjoyed a hero’s 
welcome home, which once more indicated to local Serbs that the ICTY is 
biased against them and that it could not be trusted (Subotic, 2009, p. 131). 
Moreover, as Subotic has poignantly described, the most controversial aspect 
of the entire case is the judicial justification of the sentence, according to 
which the abysmal conditions in Srebrenica “led to such a breakdown of law 
and order that Oric could not be held accountable for the crimes committed 
by his troops” (2009, p. 130). 
So, was justice served in Bosnia? Many scholars and policy makers seem 
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to think so by emphasizing the historical role that ICTY has played. But 
people in Bosnia are resigned in their evaluation of the ICTY’s lofty goals 
and achievements, albeit for different reasons. Fadila Memisevic, President 
of the Society for threatened peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was recently 
quoted by Radio Free Europe as saying: 
We were naïve that the tribunal will put an end to this evil [of mass atrocities, 
mass rapes, crimes against humanity, and genocide during the war], and yet 
we still keep moving in circles. This is not a Nuremberg Trial with clear 
understanding of who is the defeated side in the war. The worst of all, those 
who were sentenced can now, after they are released from prison, assume their 
political careers. … This is absurd. The [ICTY] verdicts do not fit the crime, and 
I don’t think that the justice has been served [in Bosnia]. (quoted in Dzenana 
Halimovic, October 15, 2012)
Against Memisevic’s statement, we can quote the words of Janko 
Velimirovic, Director of the Centre for investigating war crimes in Republika 
Srpska: 
We have the result that [among the accused in The Hague] 58% are Serbs, 25% 
Croats and 9% Bosniaks. This has created a particular understanding of the war 
in the public that is very hard to change and that does not reflect the reality. 
The available proof and documentation clearly do not support the percentages 
[of guilt] that are emerging out of The Hague Tribunal. (quoted in Dzenana 
Halimovic, October 15, 2012)
The two narratives once again reflect the different perspectives and 
struggles in post-war Bosnian society. The perspective of Memisevic brings 
out the view of many Bosniak victims’ groups that do not feel that the 
prosecutions reflect the punishment required, given the scale of the violence 
during the war. Velimirović’s view is reflective of the Serb victims’ groups 
who do not feel that their story has been heard and addressed. Both of these 
concerns, even though are very similar in the need for the perpetrators to be 
held responsible, unfortunately have been subsumed by broader narratives. 
These broader narratives are the delegitimization of the Republika Srpska’s 
existence because of the lack of widespread punishment for the scale of the 
violence committed by those who created this entity. Bosnian Serbs tend to 
group around the narrative of the defense of the legitimacy of Republika 
Srpska’s existence and argue that the court in The Hague does not equally 
address the crimes against the Bosnian Serbs. Ultimately, the victims’ 
concerns for justice are being fused with radically different Bosniak and Serb 
nation building goals and visions for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Evident in the reactions surrounding Oric’s trial, and in subsequent 
discussions over whether or not justice was served, is the link between the 
two narratives and the opposing perceptions about Srebrenica. From the 
very beginning of Dayton Bosnia, Bosniaks have shared an understanding 
that they were victims of genocide. Subotic rightly asserts that this was the 
reason why they were much more interested in the genocide case in front of 
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ) than in the individual cases before 
the ICTY (Subotic, 2009, p. 154). The genocide conviction was first passed 
in 2001, when the ICTY clearly stated in its verdict against the Bosnian 
Serb commander Radislav Krstic, “[B]y seeking to eliminate a part of the 
Bosnian Muslims [Bosniaks], the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. 
They targeted for extinction 40,000 Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica, a 
group that was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general” (Prosecutor 
vs. Krstic, 2004). This ruling was hailed as historic by the Bosnian media. It 
also created optimism that a similar ruling would soon follow in the case of 
Bosnia vs. Serbia at the International Court of Justice. The hope was that by 
winning the genocide case against Serbia, the Bosnian war should be finally 
redressed as a war of aggression and genocide against Bosniaks, which 
would then have necessitated the abolition of Republika Srpska and Serbian 
reparations to Bosnia. In other words, what could not have been achieved 
during the Dayton negotiations could have been finally achieved through the 
Court ruling. 
However, in February 2007, the ICJ issued a ruling that cleared Serbia 
of direct responsibility for the genocide and any complicity in the genocide 
that happened between 1992 and 1995. Also, the ruling reiterated the ICTY 
decision that the only confirmed case of genocide in Bosnia is the one 
committed by the Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica (Goldstone & Hamilton, 
2008). Finally, as much as the Bosniak intellectuals and leaders experienced 
the ICJ’s ruling as an insult, Serbia’s authorities were relieved. The decision 
vindicated them and effectively undermined the Bosniak claims that the war 
was one of Serbian aggression and genocide against Bosniaks.
Thus, whether justice has been served by the Oric case and others depends 
on which group representatives are consulted. Overall, there is widespread 
agreement on the part of the local population that the ICTY has done little to 
support or inspire reconciliation between the communities. In his analysis of 
the impact that the ICTY has had on “societal peace,” James Meernik finds 
little support for the argument that the ICTY has had a positive impact on 
the society. He finds that “[M]ore often than not, ethnic groups responded 
with increased hostility towards one another after an arrest or judgment” 
(Meernik, 2005, p. 287). 
Finally, how many people died in the Bosnian war? During the war, 
the international media reported the loss of more than 200,000 lives. This 
figure was based on the UN Expert Commission’s Report on war crimes in 
Bosnia that was released in 1994. However, even before the release of the 
report, similar figures were freely circulating in the media without journalists 
apparently ever bothering to substantiate them. After the war, these figures 
were further supported by claims that 160,000 victims were Bosniaks, 30,000 
Croats, and 25,000 Serbs (Srebrenica Genocide Blog, http://srebrenica-
genocide.blogspot.ca/). It is no wonder then that everybody was caught by 
surprise when an NGO based in Sarajevo, the Research and Documentation 
Center, first published its data (the so-called Book of Dead) on the number 
of dead in the war. The Center confirmed that 95,949 people were killed in 
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the war (60 percent soldiers and 40 percent civilians), a much smaller figure 
than the one usually circulated in media reports following the war. According 
to the ethnic demographic of the dead, 64,036 were Bosniaks, 24,905 Serbs, 
and 7,788 Croats (that is, around 66 percent of all victims were Bosniaks, 25 
percent were Bosnian Serbs, 5 percent Croats, and 2 percent Other). At the 
same time, the statistics are rather different for the civilian casualties: more 
than 80 percent of civilian victims were Bosniaks, 10 percent were Bosnian 
Serbs, and around 5 percent Bosnian Croats (The figures are regularly 
updated by the Center. They can be accessed on the Center’s website: http://
www.idc.org.ba/).2
 In December 2005, when the first results of the Research and Documentation 
Center became public, the Bosniak political and intellectual elites publicly 
attacked the Center’s projects on the following grounds: methodology, 
integrity of the people involved in it, sources of finding, and so on (the Center 
is internationally sponsored, like any other NGO in Bosnia). What was hard 
for the Bosniak leadership to accept was that the head of the project was 
a Bosniak himself, Mirsad Tokaca, whose Center works under the slogan 
“Truth now, peace forever”. Of course, the rationale for dismissing the work 
of the Center has been the fear that a decrease in the reported numbers of 
dead will undermine the official narrative that the war against the Bosniaks 
was genocidal in its character and thus that the Republika Srpska, as an 
illegal state, an illegitimate outcome of such a war, should be abolished. Of 
course, this is exactly how this was interpreted by the Bosnian Serb (and also 
Serbian) media. However, as Mirsad Tokaca has aptly explained: “Genocide 
is not a question of numbers; it is the matter of the identity of the victims” 
(quoted in Subotić, 2009, p. 155). The figures do support both the fact and 
the consequences of the Bosnian Serb policies of ethnic cleansing towards 
Bosniaks. After all, more than 80 percent of the civilian casualties are 
identified as Bosniak.
The debates about the character of the war, the right number of dead, 
and the Oric case show how the lack of trust between local communities 
continues to shape the content of their respective narratives. At the same time, 
the inability of the IC to address these narratives on their own terms leads to 
seemingly out of touch approaches by donors, especially in the context of 
issues of reconciliation. This is clearly evident in the case described below 
where the well-intentioned push to create cross community linkages between 
youth disregarded the reality of a post-war environment. As a member of a 
religious organization in Sarajevo stated:
 They [international donors] were insisting on a project that would bring children 
from a primarily Bosniak town and to get them to go to stay with a Serb or Croat 
family in another town. This was unacceptable to the parents and we had to 
explain the extent of these fears. Maybe you can do this type of thing in a society 
which has not experienced conflict but you cannot do that here. The context is 
simply different. (Personal Communication, May 26, 2012)
In the end, the organization did not receive funding because they were not 
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willing to comply with donor specifications. From the donor’s perspective, 
this might be hard to understand. After all, Bosnia has experienced no 
reoccurrence of violence since 1995. However, as both Sarajevo and Banja 
Luka’s interviewees have pointed out, the sense of fear and resentment still 
continues to shape interactions between individuals (Personal communication, 
May/June, 2012). 
Through their lyrics, young musicians from the Bosniak and Serb 
communities have attempted to address these fears and to show their 
understanding of the other community’s perspective but they still find it 
difficult to deal with the level of hate speech about the other that has become 
normalized (Karabeg, 2012). Two musicians in particular, Adnan Hamidovic- 
Frenkie, from Tuzla, and Djurica Stula- grof Djuraz, from Banja Luka, 
believe that hate speech has been misunderstood as patriotism by younger 
generations, but also as the politicians’ way on both sides to avert the public 
attention from the dire economic reality. Djurica concludes that, while he 
does not consider himself a separatist, the continuation of inter-communal 
distrust and fear will eventually lead to the division of the country as the only 
viable option. 
Adnan, in his song, “Letter for Milan”, tackles the subject of the extent of 
the fear and anger between the Bosniak and Serb communities (Hamidovic, 
2012). The song is written to a Bosnian Serb, Milan, and touches on such 
sensitive topics as the labelling of the Serb community as a “genocidal nation” 
by some of his Bosniak compatriots. Perhaps most striking in his lyrics is his 
frank discussion of how there are always two different perspectives on the 
causes and consequences of the Bosnian war: “our story” and “their story”. 
He acknowledges the danger that within his own Bosniak community he 
might be seen as somebody who turned his back on them by simply tackling 
the issue of reconciliation in his songs. Frenkie raps that it is hard even 
to attempt to reconcile with the other because “this will be met with your 
own community ostracizing you,” while there is also no guarantee that the 
other will return the gesture. Thus, despite their civic engagement the two 
musicians are fully aware of how relevant and powerful the group narratives 
of separation are in shaping interactions between the youth.
Similar sentiments are expressed by a young activist from Banja Luka who 
argues that there is a “Sarajevo story” which, she explains, is the version 
of the past perceived to be favoured by the Bosniak population and often 
espoused by Bosniak politicians (Personal communication, June 7, 2012). 
She has found that she is distrusted in her hometown because of her contacts 
with groups from Sarajevo that keep insisting on their work on Srebrenica. 
The connection between someone from Republika Srpska to the “Sarajevo 
story” is not readily accepted and vice versa in the case of an inhabitant of 
Sarajevo. As a civil society member from Sarajevo points out, “I think we 
lack people who are strong enough not to pay attention to how they will be 
judged for their actions in their respective communities… As it stands right 
now, the pressure and judgement of the community is paramount” (Personal 
communication, May 30, 2012). 
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In other words, while there are those who are ready critically to address 
the issues of the past, or reconcile with their former neighbours, it does not 
necessarily follow that this often-romanticized resistance on the ground 
against the domineering practices and narratives of exclusion is widespread 
or supported. Nor does it follow that such efforts at reconciliation are solely 
being restrained by nationalist politicians. The situation on the ground is 
more complex. While there is certainly potential for overcoming the divisions 
and for many individuals to connect with one another, there are still strong 
feelings about the past in many parts of Bosnia. 
Stef Jansen (2007) points to the role of pre-war local power dynamics, 
demographics, geography and history in shaping the experience of the 
violence. Jansen argues that this means that not only do people remember the 
conflict in subjective ways but that judicial institutions and scholars need to 
be aware of these dynamics (2007, p. 207). Janine Natalya Clark (2009) also 
points this out in her research with ordinary Bosnian citizens, some of whom 
wanted a broader responsibility to be addressed in relation to the crimes 
committed in the past. Some individuals, particularly those in Srebrenica 
and Potocari, felt that both Serbian and Dutch governments should be held 
responsible for the events that occurred there (Clark, 2009, p. 472). Hence, 
the idea of widespread reconciliation does not seem to be supported by 
Bosnian experience. It also shows that whatever success can be achieved in 
dealing with the past in Bosnia it is going to be far from uniformly supported 
because the conflict was more prominent in particular areas with shifting 
narratives of blame and guilt. 
To summarize, the above discussion has sought to connect two key 
arguments. The first is that while there are organizations and local actors 
in Bosnia focusing on reconciliation, their work is not always widely 
supported within their own communities. The post-war narratives that have 
emerged in the two main Bosnian cities keep members of various Bosnian 
communities separated from each other. This leads to the second point: 
without the widespread support of the communities themselves for broader 
reconciliation, little reconciliation can be achieved. Externally supported and 
top down approaches to reconciling peace and justice in Bosnia have had 
little effect. 
Conclusion
International efforts to stop perpetuating divisive categories of framing the 
responsibility for the Bosnian conflict exclusively in collectivist categories 
have had only limited success in the Bosnian context. In a somewhat 
paradoxical fashion, in the few cases when TJ seems to have been working, 
this has not been so much because of its restorative or democratizing potential; 
rather, various local civic and political organizations have always been ready 
to accept TJ mechanisms to strengthen their own respective political agendas. 
In the process, however, the normative and institutional potentials of TJ have 
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quite often been weakened. This is not to say that there is not acceptance 
of TJ principles in Bosnia, but overall, the voice of those who support TJ 
continues to be rather weak. There are of course many voices for peace and 
for a multicultural vision for Bosnia. However, we find that the ethnicized 
political environment, the harsh socio-economic reality, and the experience 
of the conflict have contributed to the persistent fears within the population, 
making the stories of division much more powerful than the stories of 
possible integration. Between the narratives of the uncertain future and the 
irreconcilable stories of the past, people are prone to find more meaning in 
the latter. 
Social interactions at the local level are crucial to the analysis of the TJ and 
peace-building process. The reason that various international organizations 
in Bosnia have not been as successful in achieving the admittedly lofty 
goals of reconciliation is because most international representatives 
have underestimated the role the local population plays and have focused 
exclusively on the actions of various local ethnic and civic elites. However, 
the parallel existence of competing state and nation building projects in Bosnia 
and their dominance over externally-supported projects of reconciliation 
cannot be explained simply by relying on one overarching variable: Bosnian 
nationalist elites work towards their own selfish interests and against the 
interests of the people. Seventeen years of peace in Bosnia have shown that 
Bosnians have agency and that they know how to use it. The stories that 
people share are many and they compete with each other: some are inclusive, 
some less so, and some are downright exclusionist. Nevertheless, they always 
provide a meaningful frame of action that allows members of various local 
communities to cope with the exigencies of everyday life in Bosnia. Some 
of those narratives should not be dismissed simply because they are overtly 
nationalistic. Instead, a more suitable approach requires an analysis of what 
makes these stories so powerful and what are the objective political, social 
and economic constraints that continue to provide a fertile ground for their 
widespread support. Recognizing these narratives as meaningful, however, 
does not mean accepting their content. Rather, it is about analyzing the power 
such content has in framing actions at the local level. 
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2 The most detailed account to date on the number of casualties in the wars in the Former 
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Committee in Serbia, Belgrade. It can be accessed online: http://www.helsinki.org.
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rs/projects_cin.html. Belgrade Humanitarian Law Centre and Sarajevo Research and 
Documentation Center have jointly published the Book of Death in the Bosnian War 
(January 2013). Not surprisingly, The Association for Camp Inmates in Republika 
Srpska has immediately reacted by publicly dismissing the validity of its findings. 
Their reaction can be found in Maksimovic, D. (January 25, 2013). RS ne prihvata 
‘Bosansku knjigu mrtvih’, Deutsche Welle, Retrieved on January 28, 2013 from http://
www.dw.de/rs-ne-prihvata-bosansku-knjigu-mrtvih/a-16549104.
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